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ABSTRACT
A Bluetooth finder is a small battery-powered device that can be
attached to important items such as bags, keychains, or bikes. The
finder maintains a Bluetooth connection with the user’s phone, and
the user is notified immediately on connection loss. We provide
the first comprehensive security and privacy analysis of current
commercial Bluetooth finders. Our analysis reveals several signifi-
cant security vulnerabilities in those products concerning mobile
applications and the corresponding backend services in the cloud.
We also show that all analyzed cloud-based products leak more
private data than required for their respective cloud services.
Overall, there is a big market for Bluetooth finders, but none
of the existing products is privacy-friendly. We close this gap by
designing and implementing PrivateFind, which ensures locations
of the user are never leaked to third parties. It is designed to run on
similar hardware as existing finders, allowing vendors to update
their systems using PrivateFind.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Systems security; Software secu-
rity engineering; Software reverse engineering; • Networks →
Application layer protocols.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Bluetooth finders are small devices that track an item’s location. The
finder’s owner installs a smartphone app that maintains a Bluetooth
Low Energy (BLE) connection with the finder. If the connection is
interrupted, the app assumes that the corresponding item is lost and
alerts the owner—for example, when leaving the house without the
wallet. The limited BLE range allows triggering alarms accurately.
In case a user is attempting to locate a nearby misplaced item, the
app is able to play a sound on a given finder within wireless range.
Localization also works in the reverse direction: Upon pressing the
finder’s button the smartphone plays a sound.
In addition to the sound-based localization, the app saves the
smartphone’s Global Positioning System (GPS) location and asso-
ciates it with the finder. Position accuracy depends on the GPS fix
and the maximum distance between finder and smartphone. The
owner is then able to retrieve the last known location of the finder.
Position data is saved locally or on a remote server.
A tracked item can move while it is out of its owner’s Bluetooth
range. For that reason, some finders allow other users to search
for a lost item. All apps are continuously scanning for currently
disconnected finders in the background and report these to the
server. Once a lost finder is spotted by another user, the owner
is informed. Figure 1 depicts the ecosystem architecture that is
required to support external position reporting and searching.
Bluetooth finders became popular in 2013 when Tile raised $ 2.6
million with a crowdfunding campaign [6]. Since then, various
finders were introduced to the market. In this work, we analyze
top-ranked finders sold worldwide: Nut Find3, Tile Mate, Tile Pro,
musegear finder, Pearl Callstel Key Finder, Gigaset g-tag, and Cube
Tracker. Additionally, we analyze a couple of lesser known brands
based on the ST17H26 chip that can be managed over various smart-
phone apps including iTracing, iSearching, and FindELFI. Our anal-
ysis uncovers severe security and privacy issues. We reported all
issues to the vendors, and most have been fixed by now. However,
despite being one of the top-selling finders, Nut still has major
security issues. We communicated these more than a year ago over
various communication channels and contacted two Computer
Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), but Nut servers are still leak-
ing user data. This demonstrates how even today adequate product
security is still being neglected by some low-cost Internet of Things
(IoT) vendors.
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Figure 1: Bluetooth finder ecosystem overview. The finder’s owner lost connectivity, but the moving finder is no longer at its
last known position. A reporter within Bluetooth range sends their GPS position to the owner via the server.
Despite the variety of available Bluetooth finders, a solution
maintaining privacy has yet to be proposed. Therefore, we design
and implement the privacy-preserving secure finder protocol Pri-
vateFind for an IoT platform similar to those seen on low-budget
finders. Our contributions are as follows:
• A comprehensive analysis of features, security, and privacy
in popular Bluetooth finder ecosystems.
• Uncovering severe security and privacy breaches in the most
popular finders Tile and Nut.
• Generalized findings of common design flaws in IoT ecosys-
tems that compromise security and privacy.
• Design of a new solution PrivateFind supporting all observed
features but providing anonymity and privacy.
• Implementation of PrivateFind as an open-source project on
a low-cost IoT platform similar to existing finder hardware.
This paper is structured as follows. We list previous security
research in Section 2. In Section 3, we analyze popular finder fea-
tures, with a focus on their infrastructure and security. We solve
the identified issues while providing all important features with Pri-
vateFind in Section 4. Our results are discussed in Section 5. Finally,
our work is concluded in Section 6.
2 RELATEDWORK
Heiland and Compton discovered and disclosed 12 vulnerabilities
in TrackR Bravo, iTrack Easy, and Nut [4]. Their analysis focused
on the Bluetooth interface and forging finder identities to access
data. We assume that they used the same standard procedure to
analyze all Bluetooth finders since the vulnerabilities found are
very similar. Their most outstanding findings are: GPS positions
of TrackR Bravo can be queried by finder identifier (CVE-2016-
6540); duplicate registration of the same iTrack Easy finder allows
to access the device’s GPS data (CVE-2016-6543); and Nut transmits
reusable session tokens without using Transport Layer Security
(TLS), thereby allowing Machine-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks
on specific accounts (CVE-2016-6548). The first and second attack
require a valid device identifier, meaning that an attacker must
either guess it or launch a targeted attack. The third attack’s severity
depends on the attacker’s network position. However, the security
analysts did not find any Tile issues despite analyzing it. Yet, we
were able to uncover security issues and data leaks, detailed in
Section 3.2.2. To the best of our knowledge, Heiland and Compton
are the only ones who did security research on Bluetooth finders.
No more vulnerabilities on the products we analyzed were listed in
the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database.
Only recently, Apple added the Find My protocol on most of their
devices [1]. As of now, Find My only runs on powerful devices that
have a regularly charged battery. All these devices are associated
with a validated iCloud account. This enablesApple to run a complex
encryption scheme. In comparison, the finders in this paper are
powered by a button cell for more than a year, and PrivateFind does
not enforce the privacy-invasive equivalent of an iCloud account.
3 ANALYSIS OF EXISTING FINDERS
In Section 3.1 we compare features of top-selling finders. This is
followed by a security analysis in Section 3.2. We conclude common
features and issues in Section 3.3.
3.1 Feature Comparison
In this section, we compare the features of a large selection of find-
ers. An overview is shown in Table 1. Despite being sold under
different names, finders often share the same slightly customized
firmware and Application Programming Interface (API). We per-
form an initial app analysis to avoid buying finders that are hard-
ware or app duplicates by inspecting the app’s code structure and
API calls. We unpack and analyze the Android apps by searching
for strings and logic analysis based on jadx [20].
3.1.1 Nut. The Nut finders support group search for lost devices
and silent zones [8]. Group search means that the user can share
the finder to friends with a QR code which can then help to locate
the finder [7]. Nut is ranked #2 on Amazonwithin the category GPS,
Finders & Accessories.
The Android and iOS apps differ a lot. Only the iOS app has
buttons for a lost finder search, but it never issued a request to
the server in practice. An API call requesting lost finders exists
in the dissected Android app but is never called. We assume some
parts of the app were never implemented. Nonetheless, both apps
report all found devices and forward them to the Nut servers in
the background. Locations are uploaded frequently—while the app
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Table 1: Finder features compared.
XXXXXXXFeature
App
Nut
Smart Tracker
Tile musegear finder,
iTrackEasy
Cube Tracker keeper iTracing, iSearching,
FindELFI
Device Nut Find3 Tile Mate,
Tile Pro
musegear finder,
Pearl Callstel Key Finder
Cube Tracker Gigaset g-tag Based on ST17H26
Declare lost ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × ×
Reports location
to server
yes yes yes yes ? no
Login Email/Phone+PW,
Social Login
Email+PW,
Social Login
Email+PW Email+PW,
Social Login
Email+PW
(Gigaset elements account)
×
is connected to the finder or when it senses other disconnected
finders. Even though locations are sent to the server, the search
feature is not available for users.
3.1.2 Tile. The leading finder onAmazon, ranked #1 inGPS, Finders
& Accessories, is Tile. While Nut and Tile features are similar, Tile is
more expensive and most features require a monthly subscription.
Basic Tile features are to let the finder play a sound and to use
finders to locate a smartphone. Users can add multiple smartphones
to their profile and also associate a limited subset of paired non-
Tile Bluetooth devices. Tile comes with a crowd search feature and
claims to have the largest finding community [21]. Once a user
account is associated to a Tile, the account and the tracker are
permanently bound. Losing account access bricks all associated
Tiles.
The location is reported every few minutes to the servers. In
addition to the exact location, each click action in the app sends
metadata to the server, such as the currently used Wi-Fi name and
MAC address, which also allows inferring a location. Similar data
is transferred every few minutes if no action is performed.
3.1.3 musegear & iTrackEasy. Several finders with a similar casing
design appear on the first page of the Amazon category GPS, Finders
& Accessories under various product names. One variant of this
is the Pearl Callstel Key Finder. This type of finder uses the same
API hosted on different servers. The user’s location is reported
to a server every 30min even in the absence of a finder, which
is more privacy-violating than the Nut implementation that only
works with physically present finders. Also, the user’s location is
transferred when the user logs in and when a lost finder is reported.
When a user marks a finder as lost [10], the server will report its
location to the owner once it is found.
3.1.4 Cube Tracker. The Cube Tracker is also amongst the most
popular finders. The Cube Pro has twice the range as the basic Cube
Tracker. Both finders have a crowd search, a replaceable battery,
and a photo trigger function [3]. Also, they can play a sound on the
finder and make the phone ring. Similar to Tile, the Cube Tracker
has an online sign-in that can be used to locate a finder.
3.1.5 keeper. We chose the Gigaset g-tag for its different technolo-
gies and app codebase, although it is not a top-selling finder. The
app requires a unique Gigaset elements account. Users can edit their
profile with the app, but the account is not required for anything—
except that it is enforced to have an account. Locations are stored
locally in a Realm [17] database and seem to be never transmitted
to the server. The app’s rating is poor because users expect to see
their finder’s location within their profile.
3.1.6 iTracing, iSearching, FindELFI. We selected the family of
iTracing, iSearching and FindELFI finders because they are one of
the cheapest top-sellers on AliExpress. They look identical and also
share the same hardware design. They are all based on the ST17H26
chip. Due to their simple hardware design, there is no possibility to
update the finder’s firmware. The apps lack all cloud-based features.
3.2 Security Analysis
We perform a technology and security analysis for all finders. Pos-
sible attack vectors strongly depend on server-related features. The
general analysis follows the same categories. In addition to these
categories, we perform a device-specific analysis. This analysis in-
cludes app and cloud services. An overview of the common analysis
results is shown in Table 2, and the individual security issues are
discussed in the corresponding subsections.
The common analysis steps and categories are as follows. De-
pending on the TLS certificate validation scheme, MITM traffic
analysis requires installing a root certificate to the smartphone, or
a server certificate needs to be replaced within the app. For MITM
traffic analysis, we use mitmproxy and Burp Suite [9, 15]. The cat-
egory API authentication summarizes how the app authenticates
with the server. Typically, such API authentication credentials can
be exfiltrated from the app. Firmware location and encryption refers
to firmware updates if the finder supports it. Updates are forwarded
by the app to the finder because it only communicates via Bluetooth.
The app caches the update in some location, ideally encrypted. In
some cases, we were able to download firmware updates directly
from the server or to decrypt the updates once they were down-
loaded by the app. Ideally, the Over-the-Air (OTA) update keeps the
firmware encrypted at all times until it is decrypted and verified
on the finder. If the app is obfuscated, analyzing or changing its
functions is more complicated. Non-obfuscated apps come with
function names. All apps contained debug strings, which made
de-obfuscation easier. The package name and class structure of Java
applications as well as API endpoints, hint to a shared codebase
between differently branded products.
3.2.1 Nut. The Nut ecosystem implements a rich set of features
but comes with the most security issues.
Traffic Interception. The first step for analysis of the app is an
MITM attack on TLS to inspect the app’s behavior. Instead of check-
ing TLS certificates, the app ignores any CertificateException
within the class X509TrustManager. Thus, even an obvious MITM
attack with invalid certificates is possible without installing new
certificates to a victim’s smartphone. Anyone with access to the
same network can sniff and manipulate Nut app traffic.
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Table 2: Common finder analysis results.
XXXXXXXAnalysis
App Nut
Smart Tracker
Tile musegear finder,
iTrackEasy
Cube Tracker keeper iTracing, iSearching,
FindELFI
TLS cert validation ignored yes pinning pinning yes n/a
API authentication no AWS
credentials
Client
certificate
AWS
credentials
Client
certificate
Basic
authentication
FW location Server
via HTTP
Amazon AWS
via HTTPS
n/a App App n/a
FW encryption App none n/a none Finder n/a
App obfuscation ✓ × × ✓ × ✓
Package name com.nut.
blehunter
com.
thetileapp
com.antilost.finder,
com.antilost.app3
com.blueskyhomesales.cube,
com.shenzhen.android.cube
com.gigaset.elements.
android.app.gtag2
com.fb.antiloss,
com.lenzetech.antilost,
com.zoqin.findelfi
API endpoint https://api.find.
nutspace.com/,
https://qa-find.
nutspace.com/
https://production.
tile-api.com,
https://locations-
prod.tile-api.com
https://api.musegear.
net:8092/CommApiEx,
https://api.ieasytec.
com:8092/CommApiEx
AWS https://api.gigaset-
elements.de/api/v1/,
https://im.gigaset-elements.
de/identity/api/v1/
-
Individual issues Leakage of all user
and location data
MQTT data leakage
and ring control
Static TLS keystore,
registration XSS
Outdated software, fake account
registration, prototype pollution
internal server error
— Duplicate apps,
usage statistics
Disclosure 10/7/2018, unfixed 5/2/2019 5/13/2019 1/28/2020 — —
Figure 2: Anonymized snapshot most recent Nut reports.
Firmware Leakage. All Nut firmware, including unreleased prod-
uct series, can be retrieved from the server. They are encrypted, but
before installing an OTA update to a finder it is locally decrypted
in the app with a static key.
Group Sharing. A group sharing link allows location information
access to other Nut users. We are able to generate arbitrary group
share links for known finders of other users without using the
app’s QR code group share feature [7]. Share links are supposed
to be generated locally inside the app. They contain the finder’s
deviceUUID, an expirationTime, and something internally called
hmac. This hmac is not what the name suggests since it is missing an
encryption key. Instead, it is generated only from known values:
hmac=sha1( userUUID|deviceUUID|expirationTime)
This share link is used to request a shareRecordUUID from the
server. In the next step, a shareRecordUUID can be used to obtain
a shareRecord. This shareRecord contains the share’s userUUID as
well as the userUUID of all users the finder is shared with. Moreover,
some privacy-concerning details such as the last known position
of a finder are included.
This results in two vulnerabilities. First, an attacker can create
share links for all devices with a known deviceUUID and userUUID.
Second, an attacker can generate a new share link and invite them-
self even if the previous share expired or was revoked by the owner
since deviceUUID and userUUID leak with a share link.
Retrieving All Lost Finder Reports. All users of the Nut app report
lost finders. Only lost finders appear during a Bluetooth device scan,
connected finders are invisible. Besides the lost finder’s ID and GPS
position, a report also contains the reporter’s identity, including
their mail address, phone number, and password hash.
An undocumented endpoint in the API leaks all recently seen
devices to the public, which represents a severe privacy issue. The
endpoint is contained in the app, but is never accessed during
normal app operation. Nut did not close this issue more than a
year after reporting it. Thus, we do not reveal the actual API call.
Figure 2 illustrates an anonymized example of the attack’s impact.
We limited the request to the server to the last few lost finders.
Even though the API function requires the user’s device_id as an
argument, it is ignored.
Responsible Disclosure. We wrote Nut an email on October 7,
2018. On January 18, 2019 we sent them a letter to their mailbox in
California. We also sent them a Twitter direct message on February
4, 2019. Due to our unsuccessful attempts, we reported the issue
to BSI CERT on March 5, 2019 who then forwarded it to US CERT
without further response. Thus, BSI forwarded the information to
CERT/CC on April 30 2019. We contacted Nut again over Facebook
on April 3, 2019 and called the number listed on their Facebook site
but were not able to contact them. We were also able to obtain the
email address of one of the developers—we sent them an email in
Chinese on April 5, 2019. CERT/CC recommended us to publicly
request CVEs disclose our findings. The missing certificate valida-
tion in the app was assigned CVE-2019-16252. However, server-side
issues in custom applications, as it is the case for the remaining
issues, are not eligible for a CVE.
3.2.2 Tile. Cloud features in the Tile ecosystem are more secure
than in the Nut ecosystem. The notification backend is based on
Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) and properly using
TLS and authentication. Yet, specific implementation details make
their infrastructure vulnerable.
Firmware Leakage. Firmware is available on the server in plain-
text. A valid link for the associated finder type can be extracted
during the firmware update process.
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Public Static Credentials for MQTT Server. The app uses anMQTT
server to allow remotely ringing the phone via another device.
Credentials for MQTT access are requested over a public API end-
point. This way, credentials are not stored inside the app—and could
change regularly. However, the MQTT credentials returned by the
API are static and the same for all users. Thus, there is insufficient
authentication towards the MQTT backend and no user separation.
Controlling Other Users’ Phones. Once connected to the MQTT
server, a request to ring any connected phone can be issued. A valid
request must contain a tileUUID, but no further access control is
performed on requests. A tileUUID can leak over various ways. For
example, it can be requested from any nearby Tile via Bluetooth,
and remote attackers can extract it with the attack described next.
User Data Leakage. In MQTT, data is exchanged by publishing
it to topics to which clients can be subscribed. Topic subscriptions
allow for wildcards by default [14, p. 57]. Tile blacklisted multi-level
wildcards represented with #, but did not include blacklist single-
level wildcards with +. When subscribing to the wildcard topic +,
an attacker can receive all MQTT messages, including messages
meant for all Tiles and system messages. Specific messages that can
be intercepted include regular status messages of the type CONTROL
_STATUS_CHANGED sent by the phones, which include the user’s mail
address, the user’s UUID, client UUID, and tileUUID. Combined with
the previous knowledge, the tileUUID can be used to ring the user’s
phone. An attacker can also subscribe to the wildcard topic $sys
/#, the so-called sys topics. The broker responds with its uptime,
program name, and version (Erlang MQTT Broker 2.2), as well as
real-time notifications of other clients connecting and disconnect-
ing, including their client UUID, user name, and IP address.
Responsible Disclosure. We disclosed all issues with detailed ex-
planations to Tile on May 2, 2019. They replied within one day and
applied fixes in a timely manner.
3.2.3 musegear & iTrackEasy. Attacks found in themusegear finder
family are rather weak. However, they indicate design flaws that
might originate from insufficient security testing.
Keystore. For customization, the app allows the vendor to con-
figure different server locations. Since servers use individual TLS
certificates, the app also has a local keystore with trusted certifi-
cates. The password to protect this keystore is static and the same
in both apps, musegear, and iTrackEasy. This enabled us to modify
the app and run a MITM attack for further analysis.
Registration Link. After creating an account, the user receives
an email with a registration confirmation link. It is possible to
include Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) contents in the link to change
the website’s appearance in the browser.
Responsible Disclosure. We informed MS kajak7 UG and KKM
Company Limited, the companies behind musegear and iTrack Easy,
on May 13, 2019. musegear reacted within less than an hour to our
first contact attempt, and we discussed all findings.
3.2.4 Cube Tracker. While we could not find any severe data leak-
age within the Cube ecosystem, there are a lot of minor security is-
sues. Their infrastructure is hosted on AmazonWeb Services (AWS),
and all traffic passes an Nginx server. Further services running in
the backend are AngularJS, ExpressJS, Mongoose, and MongoDB.
Firmware Leakage. The firmware is stored locally in the app. It
is neither signed nor encrypted.
Query Existing Users. The login website displays different error
messages for login failures versus non-existing users.
Fake Account Generation. Instead of confirming an email on ac-
count generation, a user can call the API endpoint PUT /users/<
id>/edit. This allows the attacker to create an endless amount of
accounts without the mail overhead.
Profile Picture. The profile picture can be set to an external URL.
However, as far as we observed its usage, this picture is only pre-
sented to the user themself.
Server-side JavaScript Prototype Pollution. It is possible to alter
JavaScript values by sending malicious JSON payloads toMongoose.
For example, we were able to pass a payload that turns the User
type into a generic Object type. When User-related methods are
then called on the Object, this causes an internal error of type 500
because themethod is not found. Note that this happens only within
that request, it does not escalate into the whole web service. We
cannot exclude that remote code execution becomes possible via
this issue as we do not have access to the server’s implementation,
but assume that this is very unlikely.
Outdated Software. The Nginx webserver indicates nginx/1.13.7
in the header, which is an outdated version with multiple publicly
known CVEs. Also, the AngularJS version 1.3.20 is out of support.
Responsible Disclosure. We contacted Cube Tracker on January
28, 2020, and also sent a second mail containing more details. They
promptly confirmed the reception, but communication did not con-
tinue later, likely due to COVID-19.
3.2.5 keeper. We could not find anything remarkable. The app
does not have any connected functionality besides the account,
which is never used except for logging in.
3.2.6 iTracing, iSearching, FindELFI. Even though the apps for find-
ers based on the ST17H26 chip do not report locations to the server
according to what we observed, their apps lack privacy and user-
friendliness.
Usage Statistics. During installation, the app connects once to a
server to transmit usage statistics. The statistics only contain finder
information but no user account.
App Duplicates. There seem to be around 15 copies of the orig-
inal app in Android’s Google Play Store. In the best case, it is just
customization for different resellers. However, it might be that some
copies contain malware or leak location data, even though Google
regularly checks for malware in apps.
3.3 Analysis Results
The hardware implementation of all Bluetooth finders is rather
simple. Finders themselves are not aware of locations or user data.
Logic to find lost items is implemented in the app and cloud. A
common architecture issue is that the cloud is retrieving GPS data
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from all users in plaintext. No matter if there is a vulnerability in
the implementation or not, users need to trust the cloud operator
to keep their location information private. Most apps continuously
transmit finder locations to the cloud, regardless of their lost state.
In the Tile and Cube ecosystems, which feature a Web platform
where users can view their device locations from anywhere, this
is reasonable. In contrast, Nut finders are bound to a smartphone
installation anyway. Location traces are very privacy-sensitive as
they reveal a lot about the user’s habits—and, thus, could be sold
for marketing purposes and similar. Our security analysis shows
that even the leading vendors fail to protect location and user data
in their clouds from being extracted by external attackers.
We claim that existing Bluetooth finders are privacy-invasive by
design. In most situations, GPS data could be stored locally inside
the app. Only in lost mode, reporters need to transmit location
information to the owner—which can be end-to-end encrypted.
Minimizing private data transferred and stored in plaintext reduces
the risk of data leakage if there are security issues.
4 PrivateFind: AN OPEN, SECURE, AND
ANONYMOUS FINDER SOLUTION
In the following, we describe PrivateFind, which features a similar
architecture and hardware design as existing commercial products.
PrivateFind enables finder crowd search without leaking private
data. It prevents data leakage by design, as the server never sees
any GPS locations in plaintext. Moreover, it enables anonymous
usage of the crowd search ecosystem. It aims at preventing tracking
by both the server infrastructure as well as other users. PrivateFind
is publicly available on https://github.com/seemoo-lab/privatefind.
We define two setup variants with different security and privacy
guarantees in Section 4.1. An anonymous lost finder reporting
system is introduced in Section 4.2. Reports are independent of
the setup procedure and, thus, compatible with both variants. We
discuss protocol design decisions in Section 4.3. The hardware used
for our open-source prototype and the corresponding Android app
is shown in Section 4.4.
4.1 Setup Procedure
The setup procedure establishes an end-to-end encryption key and
identifiers, proves that the owner currently owns the finder, and
comes in two variants.
End-to-end Encryption Key. During the setup, the finder and the
smartphone establish a pre-shared key e2e-key. The e2e-key can
be reset by running the setup procedure again. Keys are individual
per device; any leaked key will only compromise one finder. The
e2e-key is symmetric due to the finder’s hardware limitations.
After the setup, this key never leaves the finder and the smart-
phone. However, the finder can receive plaintext messages and
encrypt them with this key, such that only the smartphone can
decrypt it. This mechanism is used to hide GPS locations of reports
from the server by using the finder to encrypt reports about itself.
Moreover, generating reports requires the physical presence of the
respective finder. Based on these reporting properties, the reporter
can stay anonymous when sending reports to the server.
Initial and Randomized Identifier. Moreover, the finder reveals its
fixed identifier idinit during setup. This identifier never changes,
even if the finder is reset by repeating the setup procedure. The
format of this identifier is implementation-specific, e.g., it could be
a 256 bit random value. Both, the smartphone and the finder, use it
in conjunction with the e2e-key, to derive randomized identifiers
in fixed time intervals:
idrand,n+1= hmac(e2e-key, idrand,n)
While idinit never leaves the finder and the smartphone (but is
known to the server in the manufacturer-verified setup), the ran-
domized idrand can be requested by nearby devices if the owner’s
smartphone lost the connection and if the finder internally can con-
firm that it has not seen its owner since a while. Thus, PrivateFind
further increases privacy by only revealing idrand if necessary. The
finder does not appear in scan results while it has a connection to
its owner, and it can choose to refuse excessive identity requests,
even on the randomized and regularly changing identifier.
Proving Ownership. The setupmode that resets e2e-key and leaks
the unique identity idinit can only be performed by the finder’s
owner. To enter the setup mode, the owner pushes and holds the
finder’s button. Only after pressing the button like this, the finder
enters setup mode. Otherwise, it will not accept a reconfiguration.
Once the setup is finished, the setup mode must be reactivated
again by pressing the button if needed. We assume an attacker with
physical access whowants to steal an item attached to a finder could
as well remove the finder’s battery or shield it in tinfoil. This is
similar to the security assumptions made by other finder products.
Setup Variants. While both setup variants establish an e2e-key,
exchange the idinit , and ensure ownership by physical access, they
slightly differ. The local variant in Section 4.1.1 features a mode
that enables compatibility between different finder manufacturers.
The manufacturer-verified variant in Section 4.1.2 enables the man-
ufacturer to verify a finder’s identity and provides further security
to the Bluetooth communication. While we recommend using the
local variant to improve privacy, manufacturers might prefer the
manufacturer-verified variant, as it is closer to the ecosystems pro-
vided by existing products. Both variants do not require the user to
register a personal account.
4.1.1 Local Setup. The local setup, which is shown as a sequence
diagram in Figure 3a, ensures that the user has physical access to a
finder. Moreover, the setup exchanges e2e-key and idinit . There is
no third party involved in the local setup and there is no registration
with a server. Note that in this local variant idinit can also be
reset to a random value during the setup, as there are no external
dependencies on it.
4.1.2 Manufacturer-Verified Setup. The manufacturer-verified set-
up increases security at the cost of privacy. It provides the same
security properties as the local setup. On top, it enables the man-
ufacturer to validate that the finder is indeed one they created,
and adds manufacturer-verified encryption to the Bluetooth setup.
Even though finder validation makes the server able to identify
a finder during setup, messages containing precise GPS location
data will always be end-to-end encrypted between the finder and
the user who registered a finder with their smartphone. Thus, also
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Owner Finder Phone
Push and hold
button
SelectDevice(idinit )
e2e-key = random()
Setup(e2e-key)
SetupOK(idinit )
Store(idinit , e2e-key)
(a) Local setup without proof of ownership.
Owner Finder Phone Server
Push and hold
button
SelectDevice(idinit )
RegisterInit(idinit )
setup-key = random()
StartEncryptedSetup
(setup-key,
Enc(mf-key, setup-key))
Forward Enc(mf-key, setup-key))
Encrypted with setup-key e2e-key = random()
Setup(e2e-key)
Store e2e-key
SetupOK(idinit )
Store(idinit , e2e-key)
(b) Manufacturer-verified setup that proofs ownership of a legitimate device to the manufacturer.
Figure 3: Initial setup and registration variants.
this protocol variant ensures more privacy than any finder ecosys-
tem we encountered in the wild. The overall process is depicted in
Figure 3b.
Manufacturing Requirements. The manufacturer might want to
verify their manufactured devices. To this end, the manufacturer
installs an individual manufacturing key mf-key on each finder,
which is associated with its identifier idinit . The mf-key is the root
of trust between server and finder. Each finder has an individual
mf-key, which is never transmitted in plaintext but can be identified
by its idinit .
Verification During Setup. The finder notifies the server that
idinit is now active. PrivateFind does not enforce any account
registration, but in case the manufacturer would like to add this as
a property, they could add a mf-key-based setup challenge in this
step. Note that, depending on the remaining implementation, this
would also add reporter identities to the encrypted location reports.
Encrypting Bluetooth Communication. We assume communica-
tion between app and server is not compromised since it can be
protected with TLS [18]. The server certificate must be validated
and ideally is pinned [19]. Encryption methods employed by TLS
are not feasible on a low-cost finder device. Hence, the server gen-
erates a temporary random setup-key, which is used to encrypt the
setup procedure. The communication during the setup, encrypted
with setup-key, is marked with an orange dotted box in Figure 3b.
The setup-key is transferred to the app in two formats: plaintext
and encrypted. The plaintext setup-key is for the app; the app does
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not have the mf-key to decrypt the encrypted one. The app for-
wards the encrypted setup-key to the finder via Bluetooth. Only a
legitimate finder can decrypt it with its mf-key.
This possibility of securing the registration procedure with the
mf-key improves security. We do not consider Bluetooth encryption
to be sufficient. Since the finder neither has a display nor a keyboard,
Just Works pairing is applied. Assuming BLE 4.0 or 4.1 on at least
one of the involved devices, this mode is susceptible to passive
MITM attacks due to weak encryption methods [2, p. 277]. Even
in BLE 4.2 and higher, Just Works can be actively eavesdropped,
as stated in the Bluetooth 5.2 specification [2, p. 274]. Using the
mf-key as an additional root of trust mitigates this MITM risk.
4.2 Privately Reporting Lost Finders
Based on the initial setup information, finders can be located, as
shown in the sequence diagram in Figure 4. This mechanism does
not leak the lost finder’s location to the server, and the reporter’s
identity is not revealed.
A lost finder can be found by anyone because it will be discov-
erable in Bluetooth scanning if it is not connected to the owner’s
smartphone. The reporter can send a message to a lost finder that
contains the current GPS position. The finder answers this with an
encrypted message that can only be decrypted by the owner with
e2e-key. The finder only answers this message if it has not seen the
owner for a few minutes to ensure that no unnecessary reports are
generated. Finder and owner can use a pseudo-random sequence,
if available on the finder, to prevent a replay of old locations. The
current PrivateFind implementation prevents this with a counter
and an authenticated encryption mode. The owner can look up
reports by its calculated recent list of idrand .
4.3 Implementation Variants
In the following, we discuss implementation variants and point out
the current state of the PrivateFind implementation.
Identity Randomization. The finder should randomize its MAC
address as mac_addrrand to prevent tracking by nearby devices.
Thus, the finder changes its address in regular intervals—otherwise,
the randomization of the finder’s identifier idrand could be by-
passed. This MAC address randomization feature is already in-
cluded in the Bluetooth specification to ensure privacy for BLE [2,
p. 3064ff]. Usually, this address changes every 15min, but the in-
terval can be lowered to increase privacy. The interval of the MAC
address change and idrand update should be synchronized to pre-
vent tracking via asynchronous changes.
Note that the current PrivateFind code release is not using MAC
address randomization, because it requires MAC addresses for a
simplified, non-randomized finder identification during location
reports.
Report Delivery Modes. PrivateFind uses direct delivery of reports
to an owner. For direct delivery, the owner messages the server with
the currently valid idrand or a sequence of recently valid identities.
An alternative approach would be broadcast delivery. Since re-
ports are encrypted, locations would not leak. This form of broad-
cast delivery hides the fact which finder was lost and found at
which point in time from the server. However, someone who lost
an item needs to observe all reports, which causes a lot of traffic
and leaks recently valid identities.
In the current PrivateFind implementation, a reporter is not
getting any feedback. Reporters cannot verify if a finder exists. This
increases security against attackers trying to leak valid identities.
Verifying Reporters and Reports. PrivateFind does not verify a
reporter’s identity on the server-side to increase privacy. Owners
can check locally if a report was indeed created by their lost finder
if it decrypts correctly and contains a valid number of a pseudo-
random sequence. Moreover, anonymous location reports can be
displayed differently inside the app than locations observed by the
user. This helps the user to check themself if the reported location
seems legit.
The server could verify if the reported finder is real by sending
a challenge similar to the one in the setup. The challenge can again
make use of the mf-key shared between server and finder, but with
the reporter as a relay. Such a challenge would make it impossible
Phone (Reporter) Finder Server Phone (Owner)
Finds unpaired device
with unknown mac-addrrand
AreYouLost(geo-location)
e2e-message =
Enc(e2e-key,
geo-location || prng)
IAmLost(idrand , e2e-message)
FoundResponse(idrand ,
e2e-message)
Search(idrand,n..idrand,m)
Found(idrand , e2e-message)
Figure 4: Anonymous report of witnessed device.
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to replay reports already on the server-side. A disadvantage of
this approach is an increased load on the server for a property the
owner can also verify locally. Moreover, it would require the server
to ask for idinit to look up the according mf-key, which would
deanonymize reports.
The server could also restrict usage of their ecosystem to those
userswho legitimately purchased a finder. For this, themanufacturer-
verified setup needs to be extended as follows. The server can send
a challenge bound to a finder’s mf-key that can only be answered by
a legitimate finder. If this challenge is answered correctly, the server
can either confirm a user’s account registration with this, or issue
an account-less access token. Later, when users report lost finders
or search for them, these actions can be bound to that account or
token. While the GPS locations in such an approach remain en-
crypted, this always reveals the user’s or finder’s identity. However,
even this extension would still be more privacy-preserving than
existing approaches that all share GPS locations to the server. The
current PrivateFind code release has an option for such a token.
Deciding if a Finder is Lost. A finder that lost the connection
to the owner’s smartphone appears in Bluetooth scan results of
other smartphones. This might create a lot of reports in crowded
places with bad connection quality. Hence, the reporter asks the
finder if it has been disconnected for a while, instead of reporting
it immediately. Yet, this still imposes a privacy issue. There is a
possibility that an owner lost the connection but still knows the
item’s location, e.g., if the smartphone battery is empty. The report
includes the reporter’s IP address, which can be used to make a raw
guess on the finder’s geolocation.
Our PrivateFind implementation enables users to opt-out from
receiving reports by setting a flag in the finder that disables the
generation of reports. As long as this flag is set, the finder will never
answer to an AreYouLost message.
The server can keep track of owners who report their finder as
lost and propagate this information to reporters. Even though this
enables all users to see which finders are currently lost, the public
information is not associated with an IP address and the included
idrand is randomized.
Metadata on the Server. Users still need to trust the server in
some means. The server can estimate the geolocation by IP ad-
dresses. Message timing also allows it to guess whether reporter
and owner are nearby and know each other. However, in PrivateFind
this information is only transferred if the finder confirms to be lost.
In contrast to the default behavior in most commercial products,
the amount of reports is minimized and additionally anonymized.
In general, users being concerned about geolocations leaking by IP
addresses should use anonymization techniques such as Tor [16].
Users could be selfish and not send reports for anything they found
but still profit from other reporters if they are concerned about
leaking information when reporting.
Identity Export. A user might use a finder with multiple phones
or backup the finder association in case of phone loss, the e2e-
key could be exported with a QR code. Without export, only one
smartphone at a time is supported. To replace the smartphone, the
finder must run through the setup procedure again, which resets
the e2e-key.
4.4 PrivateFind Implementation
In the following section, we detail how we realized PrivateFind in
hardware, firmware, and as an Android app.
Hardware Platform. After disassembling common Bluetooth find-
ers, we became aware of the nRF51822 Bluetooth Smart Beacon
Kit [13]. Its diameter is as small as 20mm, and it comes with all
the important features. During development, we used the Bluetooth
Low Energy Development Kit for the nRF51 Series [11]. It is based on
the same chip but meant for development, which means the board
comes with additional input and output possibilities and is easier
to flash—limitations for firmware running on the chip stay similar.
The development platform already comes with a basic finder
example, which triggers an alarm on Bluetooth connection loss.
Only the PrivateFind setup, registration, and report procedures had
to be implemented.
Hardware Optimization. The development platform already of-
fers some encryption methods, such as Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES). Encryption in the lost finder reporting is Authenticated
Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), e.g., AES-CTRwith a ran-
dom nonce for the associated data and SHA256-HMAC for authen-
tication. Depending on the hardware platform, different encryption
methods can be used.
Android Application. The app runs in the background and main-
tains a Bluetooth connection with the finder established. This is
implemented using the Android BLE library by Nordic Semiconduc-
tor [12]. The last known position of a finder is saved locally and
can be displayed as shown in Figure 5b. Once the connection is lost,
it plays a sound on the smartphone or on the finder, according to
the user’s preferences. Moreover, the app searches for other lost
finders in the background and reports these. To preserve battery on
the smartphone, we use the hardware offloading of the Bluetooth
controller if supported.
(a) The twonRFplatforms:nRF51-
DK (bottom) and nRF51822 (top). (b) Mobile app.
Figure 5: PrivateFind implementation.
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5 DISCUSSION
Crowd Search. Distributed item search requires a large user base
with the app installed and running. For example, finders of three
different brands were marked as lost, and the crowd search feature
was not able to find them near a busy train station in Germany
with approximately 250 000 people passing by in 2017 [5]. A lost
item can only be found within communities that commonly use
finders. This problem gets worse with the diverse finder market
since reporting systems are not compatible at all. We observed that
online shop ratings of the same finders differ a lot, depending on
the platform and region where they are sold, and assume this is
due to the distinct communities using these finders.
Privacy Policies. Besides the technical problems we uncovered in
common Bluetooth finders, their basic concept is already privacy-
invasive depending on how data is handled exactly. Thus, we did a
check on the privacy policies of finders with online functionality.
Nut There are two different privacy policies forNut. One is pub-
licly available on their website but only refers to data their
webserver collects while browsing their sites, and another
one that is displayed when installing the app. We consider
the policy in the app to be more relevant. Yet, the app privacy
policy of Nut is surprisingly short and written in very vague
terms. The policy does not even state that Nut is collecting
location data. We assume that such a policy is not acceptable
under the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
Tile Two privacy policies were in place at the same time before
our report. When a user tried to create an account in the
app, a privacy policy from 2016 was shown. However, on
the website of Tile, a new policy from 2018 is shown [22].
The policy of the app states that the location of the user is
transmitted periodically. It also states that Tilemay collect in-
formation for statistical purposes that cannot be traced back
to an individual user anymore. In general, we consider the
privacy policy of Tile to be well-written and understandable.
musegear The privacy policy by the musegear app looks very
similar to Tile. Their privacy policy states that location data
should be regularly saved on the device, but does notmention
the regular transmission of this data. Also, their policy is
hard to read due to formatting mistakes.
CubeTracker The privacy policy of Cube Tracker is surpris-
ingly well-written, but still contains a placeholder where the
tax identifier of the company should be inserted. It allows
Cube Tracker to share data with third parties and also to
update the policy, and the user will be notified about signif-
icant changes. Also, it does not differentiate which data is
collected by the app locally and which data is shared with
the cloud service and third parties.
To summarize, the privacy policies of all tested Bluetooth finders
with connected features do not accurately reflect what the finders
and corresponding apps are doing. Therefore, we would like to
encourage the manufacturers to update their privacy policies. A
general issue is that the privacy policies in the apps differ from
the ones on the websites, and the policies are subject to change.
This makes the privacy policies very opaque in addition to missing
details on how data is processed and stored.
6 CONCLUSION
We conducted a comprehensive analysis of the most popular Blue-
tooth finders currently on the market and analyzed their security
and privacy. None of the market-leading products is designed in
a privacy-friendly way, and several of them have serious security
flaws on multiple levels:
• All products tested were designed and implemented without
a focus on privacy.
• Some of the tested products forced the user to create an
account for a cloud service not immediately required for
using the product. Other products automatically reported
the user’s location to a cloud service without an observable
reason.
• Some of the products hadminor security vulnerabilities, such
as insufficient protection of the API against unauthorized
communication. Furthermore, some products omitted proper
TLS certificate validation of the backend services.
• A few products had serious security vulnerabilities in their
corresponding backend that enabled attackers to obtain ac-
cess to private data of other users.
• One vendor ignored our reports about those weaknesses for
more than a year, despite multiple attempts to get in touch
with them over several communication channels. Until to-
day, the corresponding cloud service leaks private customer
information that can be accessed easily.
Some implementations are highly suspicious, and we cannot
rule out that this data may be collected for other purposes. Many
of those security and privacy problems can be fixed easily in the
app and the corresponding backend services, for example by not
sending any unnecessary data to the cloud service. We decided
on a more thorough approach and designed and implemented the
privacy-friendly Bluetooth finder PrivateFind that prevents location
leakage to the cloud service. Users are able to report a lost and
found Bluetooth finder anonymously, and we believe our system
achieves a more advanced security and privacy standard than any
commercial system we analyzed. Our system provides the same
features as most commercial products and runs on the same or
comparable hardware. This shows that privacy-friendly and secure
Bluetooth finders can be built without increasing expenses for the
hardware and without a loss of features for the user.
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